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INTRODUCTION
Today, the proposition that Delaware courts can grant equitable relief is
incontrovertible. Apparently, however, this proposition was debatable after
the passage in 1967 of the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL").I
* Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University. A.B. Vassar
College, 1972; J.D., Yale University, 1975. The author wishes to thank Michael
Grimes, CPA, 2007, B.S., 2009, M.A., Northern Illinois University, J.D. 2016,
Washington College of Law, for his invaluable research and steadfast dedication to this
Article.
1. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action Is Lawful, Presumably There Are
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Many scholars credit the Schnell doctrine, created in 1971, with securing
the current availability of equitable relief.2 The Schnell doctrine permits
courts to invalidate conduct that is technically in compliance with
applicable law if the court deems that conduct to be inequitable;3 therefore,
compliance with the corporate statute is the minimum, but not necessarily
the sole, requirement for legality. Throughout its forty-five-year life, the
Schnell doctrine has surfaced intermittently in Delaware case law.
Recently, the doctrine has moved front and center in Delaware corporate
law as Delaware courts have raised the specter of the Schnell doctrine to
test the validity of contentious director-enacted bylaws if and when
corporations implement them.4 While the Schnell doctrine is ingrained in
Delaware law, this Article nevertheless offers a bold recommendation:
abolish the Schnell doctrine entirely. The reason is simple: the Schnell
doctrine adds nothing positive to existing Delaware law.
The thesis of this Article accepts the view that Schnell has served the
critical function of establishing the role of equity, but argues that the
Schnell doctrine is currently superfluous for one reason: there is-or
should be-a Schnell violation only when there is also a breach of fiduciary
duty. Thus, the coexistence of the Schnell doctrine and fiduciary breaches
incorrectly suggests that a Schnell violation is different from a breach of
fiduciary duty and imposes costs for this incorrect inference. Since the
doctrine imposes costs and offers no discernable current benefit, this
Article recommends that Delaware courts abolish the Schnell doctrine.
Because this Article agrees with the vital role of equity in Delaware
corporate law, but contends that the Schnell doctrine no longer adds to that
Circumstances in Which It Is Equitable to Take That Action: The Implicit Corollary to
the Rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 Bus. LAW. 877, 881 (2005) (discussing that some
members of the Delaware bar in 1967 believed that the newly-passed Delaware General
Corporation Law (DGCL) occupied the "entire field of corporate law").
2. See infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text (depicting slightly different
views of the early role of the Schnell doctrine).
3. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
4. Delaware courts have held that forum-selection bylaws, see City of Providence
v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 233-34 (Del. Ch. 2014); Boilermakers
Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 940 (Del. Ch. 2013), and fee-
shifting bylaws in non-stock corporations, see ATP Tours, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis
Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 557-58 (Del. 2014), are facially valid, but they have also held that
they would review these bylaws again under the Schnell doctrine should the
corporations implement these respective bylaws. See, e.g., ATP Tours, 91 A.3d at 558.
Subsequent Delaware legislation made the former valid, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §
115 (West 2015), and the latter invalid for stock companies, see id. §§ 102(f), 109(b).
The Delaware legislature did not invalidate A TP's holding that fee-shifting bylaws are
valid in the context of non-stock corporations. See id § I 14(b)(2) (stating that Sections
102(f) and 109(b) shall not apply to non-stock corporations); see also infra notes 116-
123 and accompanying text.
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vitality, this proposal would not weaken the robust protection that equity
currently provides.
Part I first discusses the Schnell case and how, at its origin, it established
the role of equity in judicial review. Thereafter, Part I discusses two other
key cases: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.5 and Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas
Corp.6 All three cases are identical in one respect: after finding that the
respective directors meticulously complied with the relevant statutory
provisions, the Delaware courts in these three cases nevertheless held that
such compliance alone was insufficient. The most interesting aspect of
these cases for the purposes of this Article is that these courts gave three
different responses regarding why the directors' conduct was invalid: (1)
the Delaware Supreme Court in Schnell held that the directors' conduct was
inequitable; (2) the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger held that
directors and controlling shareholders violated their fiduciary duty of
loyalty; and (3) the Delaware Chancery Court in Blasius also held that the
directors violated their duty of loyalty, but reasoned that, because the
directors had acted in good faith, this violation was unintentional.
Since the court's response in Schnell was that the conduct was
inequitable, and the response in Weinberger and Blasius was that the
conduct breached the directors' fiduciary duties, Part II begins by
examining all cases where Delaware courts found Schnell violations and
concludes that all but two were nothing more than fiduciary breaches. Part
II then posits that these two outlier cases illuminate the cost of retaining the
Schnell doctrine because the judges in these two cases invalidated legal
conduct based solely on their sense that the directors had acted unfairly.
Although legislation has resolved the contentious issues raised in two other
recent cases,7 Part II concludes with an analysis of these two cases that
Delaware courts had, prior to this legislation, reserved for a future Schnell
analysis. As a result, while Part I demonstrates that, at its origin, the
Schnell doctrine served a valuable function, Part II demonstrates that today,
the doctrine is superfluous-as any Schnell violation should constitute a
breach of fiduciary duties- and dangerous if the forbidden conduct falls
short of the fiduciary mark.
Part III questions the status quo, which is that Delaware courts currently
can utilize both the Schnell doctrine and fiduciary law to invalidate
otherwise legal conduct. After examining whether there are benefits from
5. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
6. 564 A.2d 651 (Del Ch. 1988); see also MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813
A.2d 1118, 1127-32 (Del. 2003) (affirming the Blasius doctrine).
7. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 555 (Del. 2014);
Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch.
2013); see also supra note 4.
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using these overlapping tools, the Article rejects all arguments that favor
maintaining the Schnell doctrine. In addition, Part III concludes that while
there are no costs, there are benefits to abolishing the doctrine. Thus, the
Article concludes with the recommendation that Delaware courts consider
abolishing the Schnell doctrine.
I. THE SCHNELL DOCTRINE AND ITS ROLE IN DELAWARE LAW
A. Schnell
When the Delaware legislature passed the DGCL in 1967, the debatable
issue was not whether directors had to comply with the statute, but whether
such compliance alone was sufficient. Now Chief Justice of the Delaware
Supreme Court, but then-Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Court of
Chancery, Leo Strine, wrote that "some elements of the Delaware bar
believed that the then-new DGCL should be viewed as more or less
occupying the entire field of corporate law ... ",,8 This view of the DGCL
was tested in Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. when incumbent
directors of Chris-Craft Industries, fearing they would lose a proxy fight,
took two actions that the corporate statute and the corporation's governing
documents authorized: the directors accelerated the annual meeting by five
weeks, and they moved the meeting location from its usual place in New
York City to a remote part of upstate New York.9 The dissidents sued,
claiming that the directors' actions effectively thwarted the dissidents'
ability to conduct a proxy contest that they had planned for the original
meeting date.10 In contrast, the directors argued that they had the power to
take the two steps that they did-a view the Delaware Court of Chancery
shared. The Delaware Court of Chancery reasoned that, since the board's
actions complied with the statute, the corporation's certificate, and its
bylaws, the court could not order any relief."
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision.1 2 In a
three-page opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that because
corporate management had attempted to use the corporate statute for the
purposes of "perpetuating itself in office"'13 and "obstructing the legitimate
efforts of dissident stockholders,"' 4 corporate management's conduct was
8. See Strine, supra note 1, at 881.
9. 285 A.2d 430, 431-32 (Del. Ch. 1971), rev'd, 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
10. Id. at 432.
11. Id. at437.
12. See generally Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
13. Id. at 439.
14. Id.
Vol. 5:2
ABOLISHING THE SCHNELL DOCTRINE
inequitable.' 5 The court did not mention the words "fiduciary duties" in
describing the directors' conduct. In response to the directors' and the
chancery court's view that the directors had the legal authority to take the
actions they took, the Delaware Supreme Court created the maxim that has
become known as the Schnell doctrine: "[Ilnequitable action does not
become permissible simply because it is legally possible."16
Chief Justice Strine has credited the Schnell doctrine with changing
Delaware law to its current status where directors must comply with both
their legal and equitable obligations.' 7 Former Delaware Supreme Court
Justice Jack Jacobs expressed a slightly different view, arguing that the
1967 DGCL revisions sought to respond to the need of the Delaware bar
for predictability but that equity always had some role.' 8 Whatever the
vibrancy of the role of equity after the DGCL passed, however, all agree
that the Schnell doctrine ingrained the important role of equity in judicial
review.' 9  Indeed, another Delaware Supreme Court Justice, Randy
Holland, wrote that "Schnell made it plain that in Delaware, equity
trumps., 20 One article described well the interplay of the Delaware statute
and the Schnell doctrine:
[T]he DGCL gives directors a strong hand to manage the corporation,
and the primary non-ballot box legal constraint on them is the
enforcement of their equitable fiduciary duties. That is, what is critical
to recognize is that the powers entrusted to directors by the DGCL may
only be exercised to advance proper corporate interests. Modernly, that
principle is most famously embodied in the Delaware Supreme Court's
decision in Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., which reaffirmed the
long-standing notion that 'inequitable action [is] not ... permissible
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Strine, supra note 1, at 881 (noting that Schnell was the first case to reject
"the proposition that compliance with the DGCL was all that was required of directors
to satisfy their obligations to the corporation and its stockholders").
18. Jack B. Jacobs, The Uneasy Truce Between Law And Equity in Modern
Business Enterprise Jurisprudence, 8 DEL. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2005); cf Robert K. Clagg,
Jr., An "Easily Side-Stepped" And "Largely Hortatory" Gesture?: Examining the 2005
Amendment to Section 271 of the DGCL, 58 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1320 (2009) ("The role
of equity in Delaware's corporate jurisprudence has ebbed and flowed throughout
history, always making its exact place somewhat difficult to pin down.").
19. See Jacobs, supra note 18, at 7 (stating that Schnell "marked the birth of the
'equity' model first in Delaware and later in other states"); Strine, supra note 1, at 883.
20. DELAWARE SUPREME COURT: GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY 1951-2001 92 (Randy J.
Holland & Helen L. Winslow eds., 2001); see also Clagg, supra note 18, at 1320-21
(noting that Schnell "gave rise to the basic equitable dynamic inherent in Delaware's
corporate jurisprudence today"); J.W. Verret, Defending Against Shareholder Proxy
Access: Delaware's Future Reviewing Company Defenses in the Era of Dodd-Frank,
36 J. CORP. L. 391, 418 (2011) (noting that the DGCL gave directors wide discretion
that is tempered by the Schnell doctrine).
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simply because it is legally possible.' In Schnell, the Delaware Supreme
Court emphatically voiced its acceptance of the importance of fiduciary
duty review in ensuring that the capacious authority granted to directors
by the DGCL was not misused.
2
'
Thus, if there had been any question of the existence or vitality of the role
of equity after the DGCL passed, Schnell ended that debate.
B. Weinberger
In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. ,2 the Delaware Supreme Court resolved the
contentious issue of the requirements for a controlling-shareholder merger
that freezes out minority shareholders. Although the directors complied
23
with the merger requirements of the DGCL, the Delaware Supreme Court
in Weinberger invalidated the going-private transaction at hand without
24
mentioning the Schnell doctrine. Instead, the court reasoned that the
directors had breached their fiduciary duties in this conflict-of-interest
transaction because the directors denied critical information both to the
corporation's outside directors and to the minority shareholders, thus
negating any validation of the transaction from the shareholder vote.
25
Moreover, because the shareholder vote was invalid, defendants had to
demonstrate that the merger was entirely fair, a burden they failed to
meet.26 Noting that it was a long-held view that majority shareholders and
21. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti & Jeffrey M.
Gorris, Loyalty's Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporate Law,
98 GEO. L.J. 629, 641-42 (2010). The interplay of the Schnell doctrine and fiduciary
review, as conveyed in the quoted text, is central to this Article's thesis and will be
discussed in more detail infra Part II.
22. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251 (West 2015).
24. While not criticizing Weinberger for failing to discuss the Schnell doctrine,
one article noted that Weinberger's significance is tied to the Schnell doctrine, stating
that "[i]n fairness, Schnell ... is the real genesis of this change, permitting courts to set
aside otherwise lawful transactions if they find unfairness, thus elevating equity over
law." William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law's
Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 18 n.94 (2009).
25. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712. The Delaware Supreme Court also held: (i)
Plaintiffs, in challenging a cash-out merger, shoulder the initial burden of alleging
specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct to demonstrate the
unfairness of the merger terms to the minority, id. at 703; (ii) Where corporate action
has been approved by an informed vote of a majority of the minority shares, plaintiffs
bear the burden of showing the transaction was unfair to the minority, id.; (iii) Going-
private transactions no longer need to have a valid business purpose, id. at 705-06; (iv)
Entire fairness requires both fair dealing and fair price, id. at 711; (v) The valuation
methodology in an appraisal proceeding should be based on all relevant valuation
criteria rather than the traditional Delaware block method, id. at 712-13; and (vi) The
remedy of quasi-appraisal rights would be available to certain shareholders so they
could utilize Weinberger's new valuation methodology, id. at 714-15.
26. Id. at 703.
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the directors they designate owe the target corporation and its minority
shareholders an "uncompromising duty of loyalty," 27 the court wrote:
"There is no 'safe harbor' for such divided loyalties in Delaware. When
directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they
are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous
inherent fairness of the bargain."
28
C. Blasius
In Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., the directors acted in full
compliance with both the DGCL and Atlas Corporation's ("Atlas") charter
when, in the midst of a proxy contest from Blasius Industries ("Blasius"),
the Atlas directors increased the size of the board by two positions and then
filled those two board vacancies. 29 While the directors' actions increased
the Atlas board from seven to nine members, Atlas' charter permitted a
fifteen-member board.30 The net effect, however, thwarted Blasius' chance
to elect a majority of directors, as now there were only six open seats-
instead of eight-on the fifteen-member Atlas board. Blasius attacked the
Atlas board's action as an entrenchment tactic, in violation of the Schnell
doctrine. 3' The Delaware Court of Chancery reasoned that if Blasius was
correct that the Atlas board was acting for selfish reasons, the board's
action would clearly violate the Schnell doctrine: "[P]laintiffs say ... that
asserted policy differences were pretexts for entrenchment for selfish
reasons. If this were found to be factually true, one would not need to
inquire further. The action taken would constitute a breach of duty.
Schnell ...,32 Chancellor William Allen ultimately concluded, however,
that the board was acting in good faith, not selfishly, in order to thwart
Blasius' plan which the directors feared would harm the corporation.33
Despite this finding, the Atlas directors were not off the hook, as the court
reasoned that the directors' good faith could not create power for the board
that it lacked; instead, the court held that directors lacked the power to act
for the sole or primary purpose of thwarting a shareholder vote:
34
The only justification that can ... be offered for the action taken is that
27. Id. at 710.
28. Id.
29. 564 A.2d 651, 656 (Del Ch. 1988).
30. Id. at 654.
31. Id. at 657.
32. Id. at 658. But see infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (delineating other
cases that have mixed holdings on whether defendants must act with an improper
motive to violate the Schnell doctrine).
33. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 658.
34. Id. at 661.
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the board knows better than do the shareholders what is in the
corporation's best interest. While that premise is no doubt true for any
number of matters, it is irrelevant... when the question is who should
comprise the board of directors. The theory of our corporation law
confers power upon directors as the agents of the shareholders; it does
not create Platonic masters .... [T]here is a vast difference between
expending corporate funds to inform the electorate and exercising power
for the primary purpose of foreclosing effective shareholder action.V5
The Delaware Court of Chancery formulated a test whereby, if the
directors' primary purpose is to disenfranchise their shareholders, the
directors must show a compelling purpose for their actions36-a burden that
the directors in Blasius failed to overcome.37  Moreover, despite finding
that the directors had acted in good faith, the court held that the board's
action "constituted an unintended violation of the duty of loyalty that the
board owed to the shareholders."
38
To be sure, Blasius is a controversial decision from a number of
perspectives, largely due to the incongruities of the compelling-purpose
test.39 What has not been under attack, however, is the court's reasoning
that directors are not home-free simply because their actions complied with
the statute. The most noteworthy point for this Article is the court's
35. Id. at 663.
36. Id. at 661; see also MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003)
(affirming the Blasius test).
37. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 662.
38. Id. at 663. The court noted that unintended breaches of the duty of loyalty are
"unusual but not novel." Id. (citing to Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 906
(Del. Ch. 1980), and AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103
(Del. Ch. 1986)). For other cases where courts have found that the directors had not
acted in their own self-interest but were nevertheless held to have committed a
technical violation of the duty of loyalty, see generally Johnston v. Pedersen, 28 A.3d
1079 (Del. Ch. 2011), where the directors enacted a provision in a Series B Preferred
stock plan to give these shareholders veto power over any change in control to maintain
stability in the corporation rather than to entrench themselves in control, and see
generally Thorpe v. CERBCO, 676 A.2d 436 (Del. 1995), where the controlling
shareholder, as a director, voted against an offer for the corporation to sell all of its
assets because he knew he would veto the transaction if the board submitted it to a
shareholder vote.
39. One criticism is that the compelling purpose test in not a true test as no
directors are ever likely to be able to provide a satisfactory reason for purposefully
disenfranchising their shareholders. See Mercier v. Inter-Tel, Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 806
(Del. Ch. 2007) (noting that Blasius' compelling-justification test is almost impossible
to satisfy); Strine, supra note 1, at 892 (describing the compelling-justification test as
an "admittedly onerous standard"). Another criticism is, despite Chancellor Allen's
reasoning to the contrary, that the board did have the power to take the action it took.
See id. at 891 ("The Atlas board deprived Blasius of no legal right; it merely closed off
an opportunity that had dropped in Blasius's lap because of the Atlas board's prior
inattention .... [T]he Atlas board was empowered to do just what it did.").
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conclusion that because the directors were not acting selfishly, they could
violate their fiduciary duty of loyalty unintentionally but could not violate
the Schnell doctrine.40 In so holding, Chancellor Allen articulated a view
that the Schnell doctrine invalidates only selfish conduct. 41 Moreover,
Chancellor Allen delineated the capacious breadth of the duty of loyalty as
encompassing both selfish as well as good-faith violations.
D. Summary of Schnell, Weinberger, and Blasius
While Schnell established equitable review in Delaware corporate law,
Weinberger and Blasius added to that dynamic. Both Schnell and Blasius
pertained to directors' attempts to interfere with shareholder voting, while
Weinberger concerned a going-private transaction. Both Schnell and
Weinberger held that directors acted out of self-interest, while the court in
Blasius, in contrast, found that the directors were not acting selfishly.43
The court in Blasius nevertheless held that the directors breached their duty
of loyalty, as did the court in Weinberger. Finally, while Schnell does not
mention fiduciary duties and Weinberger does not mention the Schnell
doctrine, Blasius discusses both the Schnell doctrine and fiduciary duties.
The import of considering Weinberger and Blasius together is to
highlight that there can be both inequitable as well as good-faith breaches
of the duty of loyalty. While it is clear that Schnell's inequitable conduct is
different from Blasius' good faith breach of fiduciary duties and there are
different judicial views on whether a bad motive is required to violate the
Schnell doctrine, 4 the pivotal remaining issue is whether Schnell's
inequitable conduct is different from Weinberger's inequitable breach of
fiduciary duty. The next section will demonstrate that a true Schnell
violation is nothing more than a breach of fiduciary duty.
40. See supra notes 33, 38, and accompanying text.
41. Some subsequent cases disagree that Schnell violations require an improper
motive. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (delineating cases that hold
improper motive is not required to violate the Schnell doctrine from cases that hold the
opposite).
42. Delaware courts have enlarged the contours of the duty of loyalty not only by
including both intentional and unintentional violations, supra note 38 and
accompanying text, but also by including issues outside of the traditional financial self-
dealing, such as breaches of the duty of good faith. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362,
370 ("Good faith is a subsidiary element.., of the fundamental duty of loyalty.")
(internal quotations omitted).
43. See supra notes 13, 25, 33, and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (discussing the conflict among
cases regarding whether an improper motive is needed to violate the Schnell doctrine).
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II. IS SCHNELL'S INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DIFFERENT FROM A BREACH OF
FIDUCIARY DUTY?
As noted above, 45 the Delaware Supreme Court in Schnell invalidated
the directors' action on equitable grounds, but it never addressed whether
the directors had breached their fiduciary duties. The issue of whether
Schnell's failure to label the directors' inequitable conduct a breach of
fiduciary duty meant that Delaware courts view these as different doctrines
has mixed support in the Schnell cases: some Schnell cases fail to mention
fiduciary duties;46 some Schnell cases discuss fiduciary duties without
concluding that the directors breached them;47 and other cases invoke the
Schnell doctrine to warn fiduciaries of the courts' equitable powers48 but
instead base the holding on a violation of fiduciary duty.49
45. Supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
46. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (holding
that management's conduct was inequitable without mentioning "fiduciary duties" in
describing the directors' conduct); Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 906, 914
(Del. Ch. 1980) (holding that the board's bylaw amendment was inequitable under
Schnell without mentioning fiduciary duties); Telvest, Inc. v. Olson, 1979 WL 1759, at
*7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 1979) (finding that the board's distribution of preferred stock was
the kind of conduct "deplored in Schnell" without mentioning fiduciary duties even
though the board's decision was self-serving and improperly motivated).
47. See Esopus Creek Value LP v. Hauf, 913 A.2d 593, 602-05 (Del. Ch. 2006)
(discussing fiduciary duties, but finding that the directors' decision, although made
without improper motive or entrenchment effect, was unfair under Schnell); Linton v.
Everett, No. 15219, 1997 WL 441189, at *10 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1997) (finding that the
directors' bylaw amendment was inequitable under Schnell without discussing
fiduciary duties in this part of the opinion); Packer v. Yampol, 1986 WL 4748, at *13-
18 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 1986) (discussing the board's fiduciary duties but finding that the
creation of preferred voting stock was a violation of Schnell without concluding that
the board violated its fiduciary duties); Dart v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., No.
7366, 1985 WL 21145, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1985) (dismissing the plaintiffs'
allegations that they could state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty but finding that it
was possible that a leveraged buy-out could have "resulted in an impermissible
inequity" to the shareholders under Schnell).
48. See, e.g., Delaware Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Christiana Care Health Servs., Inc., 892
A.2d 1073, 1078 (Del. 2006) (citing, but not applying, Schnell to the issue of whether a
successor corporation in a merger became the insured party under an insurance policy);
Farahpour v. DXK, Inc., 635 A.2d 894, 901 (Del. 1994) (citing Schnell and suggesting
that courts could invalidate a corporation's conversion from a nonprofit, non-stock
corporation to a for-profit stock corporation, but ultimately declining to do so);
Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 239 (Del. 1982) (citing Schnell to wam
fiduciaries that "careful judicial scrutiny will be given a situation in which the right to
vote for the election of successor directors has been effectively frustrated and denied by
the willful perpetuation of a shareholder-deadlock and the resulting entrenched board
of directors" but not basing the holding on the Schnell doctrine); Petty v. Penntech
Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975) (citing to Schnell but declining to use
the doctrine to invalidate directors' attempt to redeem preferred shares).
49. See, e.g., MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1132 (Del. 2003)
(citing Schnell but basing the holding on other cases and concluding that the directors
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Complicating this analysis is that there are only a handful of Schnell
cases, and, as yet, courts have not established any unifying set of rules to
cabin this doctrine.50 Specifically, courts in only fourteen cases, including
Schnell itself, have invalidated conduct based on the Schnell doctrine. 5 1 In
two of these fourteen Schnell cases, the courts found both a Schnell
violation and a breach of the duty of loyalty;5 2 in five other cases, the
breached their fiduciary duties); Phillips v. Insituform, Inc., No. 9173, 1987 WL
16285, at *9-10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 1987) (citing Schnell but basing the holding on
another doctrine and concluding directors breached their fiduciary duties); Am. Pac.
Corp. v. Super Food Servs., Inc., No. 7020, 1982 WL 8767, at *325 (Del. Ch. Dec. 6,
1982) (citing Schnell but granting injunctive relief based on Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) and finding that the directors breached their fiduciary
duties); Young v. Valhi, 382 A.2d 1372, 1378 (Del. Ch. 1978) (citing Schnell but
holding that the directors breached their fiduciary duty).
50. Of the fourteen cases discussed, infra note 51, six are about shareholder voting
for directors. See Schnell, 285 A.2d at 437; Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int'l, Inc., 940 A.2d
43, 45 (Del. Ch. 2008); Linton, 1997 WL 441189, at*]; Hubbard v. Hollywood Park
Realty Enters., Inc., No. 11779, 1991 WL 3151, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1991); Packer,
1986 WL 4748, at *1; Lerman, 421 A.2d at 912. The remaining eight cases are about
mergers or are transactional law related. See Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp.,
498 A.2d 1099, 1100 (Del. 1985); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 971 (Del.
1977), overruled on other grounds by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del.
1983); Berger v. Intelident Solutions, Inc., 911 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Del. Ch. 2006);
Esopus, 913 A.2d at 598-601; Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1028-30
(Del. Ch. 2004); Hamilton v. Nozko, No. 13014, 1994 WL 413299, at *1 (Del. Ch. July
27, 1994); Dart, 1985 WL 21145, at *1; Telvest, 1979 WL 1759, at *1. Four of these
cases involved shareholder voting on transactions. See Esopus, 913 A.2d at 598-601;
Berger, 911 A.2d at 1166; Dart, 1985 WL 21145, at * 1; Telvest, 1979 WL 1759, at * 1.
See generally Mary Siegel, Going Private: Three Doctrines Gone Astray, 4 N.Y.U. J.L.
& Bus. 399, 420-21 (advocating that, while the Schnell doctrine facially has no
subject-matter limits, courts should limit the doctrine to cases that negatively impact
shareholders' voting rights).
51. Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1107; Singer, 380 A.2d at 979-80; Schnell, 285 A.2d at
437; Portnoy, 940 A.2d 43, at 74-75; Esopus, 913 A.2d at 604-05; Berger, 911 A.2d at
1174-75 ; Hollinger, 844 A.2d at 1081; Linton, 1997 WL 441189, at *9-10; Hamilton,
1994 WL 413299, at *6-7; Hubbard, 1991 WL 3151, at *7, *12 n.9; Packer, 1986 WL
4748, at *15; Dart, 1985 WL 21145, at *5; Lerman, 421 A.2d 913; Telvest, 1979 WL
1759, at *1-2. Courts in a few other cases have considered applying the Schnell
doctrine but found the defendants' strategic maneuvers were not inequitable under
Schnell because the election process ultimately allowed shareholders to vote. See
Accipiter Life Sci. Fund, L.P. v. Heifer, 905 A.2d 115, 126-27 (Del. Ch. 2006);
Dolgoff v. Projectavision, Inc., Civ.A. No. 14805, 1996 WL 91945, at *7-8 (Feb. 29,
1996); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1123 (Del. Ch. 1990). One court
applied the Schnell doctrine in the partnership context. See Twin Bridges Ltd. P'ship v.
Draper, No. Civ.A. 235 1-VCP, 2007 WL 2744609, at *21 (Del. Ch. Sept. 14, 2007).
52. See Portnoy, 940 A.2d at 74-75 (finding the CEO breached fiduciary duties
and violated the Schnell doctrine by intentionally using corporate assets to coerce
shareholders into voting as the CEO wanted); Hollinger, 844 A.2d at 1081 (finding that
the conduct of the CEO and controlling shareholder was a breach of fiduciary duty and
a violation of Schnell because the shareholder-enacted bylaws' sole purpose was to
prevent the board from performing its statutorily-authorized duties and to effectuate
illegal or inequitable activities).
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courts stated, in rejecting a motion to dismiss53 or in granting a preliminary
injunction,54 that they could find a fiduciary breach and a Schnell violation
based on the complaint. Thus, in seven of the fourteen cases, the court both
applied the Schnell doctrine and held, or strongly intimated, that there was
a breach of fiduciary duties.
There are two approaches to analyzing the remaining seven cases. In
these cases, the respective judges held that there were Schnell violations,
but the judges either did not mention fiduciary duties or mentioned
fiduciary duties only in passing without analyzing or applying them.55 On
the one hand, one can view these cases as involving breaches of fiduciary
duty even though the respective judges did not articulate this breach either
directly or indirectly. On the other hand, if the prohibited conduct in these
cases did not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, such a holding would
suggest that fiduciary conduct can violate the Schnell doctrine simply by
failing to pass a judge's "smell" test. A review of these seven cases easily
56puts five in the former category. The directors' conduct in the remaining
two cases, Esopus Creek Value LP v. HauJf7 and Dart v. Kohlberg, Kravis,
Roberts & Co.,58 however, did not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. As
such, these cases are significant for both exposing a weakness in the
Schnell doctrine and providing support for abolishing the doctrine.
53. See Rabkin, 498 A.2d. at 1106 (reversing the chancery court's dismissal of the
plaintiffs' allegation of a "breach of fiduciary duty under Schnell .. "); Singer, 380
A.2d at 980 (reversing the chancery court's dismissal and concluding under Schnell
that the controlling shareholders manipulated their "corporate power solely to eliminate
the minority" in violation of the "fiduciary duty owed by the majority to the minority
stockholders"); Berger, 911 A.2d at 1174-75 (denying defendants' motion to dismiss
under Schnell because the defendants intentionally deprived the shareholders of their
statutory right to seek appraisal and because the controlling shareholder violated its
"fiduciary duty of disclosure"); Hamilton, 1994 WL 413299, at *6-7 (denying
defendants' motion to dismiss under Schnell because the board intentionally delisted
the corporation to force the minority to sell their shares at a grossly unfair price, which
constituted "an actionable breach of fiduciary duty").
54. See Hubbard, 1991 WL 3151, at *7, *12 n.9 (granting a preliminary injunction
and finding that the plaintiff was likely to succeed on his claim that directors' failure to
waive advance notice bylaws, when the board materially changed its position after the
nomination date passed, could constitute a breach of fiduciary duties and a violation of
Schnell).
55. See generally Schnell, 285 A.2d 437; Esopus, 913 A.2d 593; Linton, 1997 WL
441189; Packer, 1986 WL 4748; Dart, 1985 WL 21145; Lerman, 421 A.2d 906;
Telvest, 1979 WL 1759.
56. Schnell, 285 A.2d 437; Linton, 1997 WL 441189; Packer, 1986 WL 4748;
Lerman, 421 A.2d 906; Telvest, 1979 WL 1759.
57. 913 A.2d 593 (Del. Ch. 2006); see discussion of Esopus infra notes 79-85, 90-
94, and accompanying text.
58. 1985 WL 21145 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1985); see discussion of Dart infra notes
86-89, 95-96 and accompanying text.
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The first of these seven cases is Schnell, where the court reasoned that
because corporate management had attempted to use the corporate statute
for the purposes of "perpetuating itself in office, 59 and "obstructing the
legitimate efforts of dissident stockholders," 60 management's conduct was
inequitable. Similarly, in Linton v. Everett, the court found the directors'
actions of manipulating the timing of the shareholder meeting-so as to
give shareholders short notice of the meeting-deprived the shareholders of
a chance to run an opposition slate.6' Despite the courts' failure in both
cases to label the directors' conduct a breach of fiduciary duty, many cases
specifically hold that directors or controlling shareholders violate their
fiduciary duties if they manipulate the corporate machinery to perpetuate
their own control. 62 Indeed, as noted above in Blasius,63 even if directors
manipulate the corporate machinery to perpetuate control for unselfish
reasons, such manipulations nevertheless constitute a breach of fiduciary
duty. As such, the directors in Schnell and Linton violated their fiduciary
duties.
Similarly, if the facts in Schnell constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, it is
beyond debate that the conduct in the third of these seven cases, Lerman v.
64Diagnostic Data, Inc., is a breach of fiduciary duty as well. In Lerman,
the directors of Diagnostic Data, Inc. ("Diagnostic") amended a bylaw so
that directors could change the date of the annual meeting from a fixed date
to a date to be determined by management. Diagnostic's management then
59. Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439.
60. Id.
61. Linton, 1997 WL441189,at*9-10.
62. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979-80 (Del. 1977)
("[T]hose who control the corporate machinery owe a fiduciary duty to the minority in
the exercise thereof over corporate powers and property, and the use of such power to
perpetuate control is a violation of that duty."), overruled on other grounds by
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v.
Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150, 185 (Del. Ch. 2005) ("Corporate fiduciaries may not
utilize corporate machinery for the purpose of perpetuating themselves in office.");
Hamilton v. Nozko, No. 13014, 1994 WL 413299, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 27, 1994)
(ruling affirmatively and applying the Schnell doctrine when answering the question of
whether "corporate fiduciaries commit an actionable breach of fiduciary duty" in
manipulating the corporate machinery for personal advantage); Chrysogelos v. London,
Civ. A. No. 11910, 1992 WL 58516, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 25, 1992) ("[I]f corporate
directors manipulate the corporate machinery.., for the sole or primary purpose of
perpetuating themselves in office, they violate a fiduciary duty owed to the corporation
and its shareholders.") (internal quotations omitted) (citing Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d
619, 627 (1984)); Societe Holding Ray D'Albion S.A. v. Saunders Leasing Sys., Inc.,
C.A. No. 6648, 1981 WL 15094, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 1981) (citing Singer, 380
A.2d at 979).
63. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
64. 421 A.2d 906, 907, 914 (Del. Ch. 1980).
2016
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
fixed the date sixty-three days in the future.6 5 Since another bylaw required
insurgents to submit the names of their nominees more than seventy days
before the meeting, the newly-adopted bylaw that changed the meeting date
to sixty-three days made it impossible for the insurgents to run a competing
slate of nominees. 66 Given that the Schnell board's actions had the effect
of hindering insurgents' efforts and that the Lerman board's actions went a
step further and actually prevented the insurgents' efforts, the conduct
giving rise to the Schnell violation in Lerman also constituted a breach of
fiduciary duty.
While Schnell and Lerman involved directors manipulating election-
related bylaws, Delaware courts have held that other mechanisms that
entrench directors in office will also violate the Schnell doctrine.
Defendant directors in the fourth case, Packer v. Yampol, sought to
perpetuate themselves in office by issuing newly created preferred stock
with supervoting features to the CEO and other defendants.67  Citing
Schnell, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the directors' "primary
purpose was to obstruct the plaintiffs' ability to wage a meaningful proxy
contest in order to maintain themselves in control. 68  Once again, any
manipulation of the corporate machinery to perpetuate control is a violation
69
of fiduciary duties.
Two other cases held directors violated the Schnell doctrine for
manipulation of shareholder voting, not for the election of directors but for
the statutorily-required shareholder vote for organic changes. 70 In the fifth
case, Telvest, Inc. v. Olson, the board created and sought to dividend
preferred stock that required a supermajority vote for organic changes with
any shareholder owning twenty percent or more of the common stock.7 '
65. Id. at911.
66. Id. at 912.
67. 1986 WL 4748, at *3 (Del. Ch. 1986).
68. Id. at * 14-15. Although finding that the business judgment rule did not apply
because defendants were not disinterested or independent, the court did not analyze
whether defendants breached their fiduciary duties and instead held that they violated
the Schnell doctrine. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (delineating a series of
Schnell cases that discuss fiduciary duties but do not explicitly hold that the directors or
controlling shareholders breached such duties).
69. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (delineating cases that hold that, if
directors or controlling shareholders manipulate the corporate machinery to perpetuate
their own control, they have violated their fiduciary duties).
70. The Delaware corporate statute requires a shareholder vote for mergers and
consolidations, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251 (West 2015), sales of substantially all
assets not sold in the ordinary course of business, see id. § 271, and voluntary
dissolution, see id. § 275. The Delaware default rule requires a majority of outstanding
shares to approve these transactions. See id. §§ 251(c), 27 1(a), 275(b).
71. 1979 WL 1759, at *1, *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 1979).
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This newly created preferred stock effectively altered the voting process for
the common stock: instead of a majority vote for organic changes, a
supermajority would now be required, thereby diluting any challenge to
management's incumbency.72 Plaintiff, the owner of twenty percent of the
stock, sought a preliminary injunction against the issuance of this preferred
stock and alleged that the board's action was self-serving and improperly
motivated.73 The Delaware Court of Chancery doubted that the new stock
was valid preferred stock74 and, further, doubted that the board could
effectively amend the certificate of incorporation's voting requirements
simply by a board resolution. 75 Nevertheless, the court assumed, arguendo,
that the board could legally take the actions proposed.76  The court
nevertheless granted the preliminary injunction, reasoning that the board's
conduct "would fall within the type of conduct deplored in Schnell."77
Similar to many other cases that violated the Schnell doctrine, the directors'
actions that served to entrench them in office constituted a breach of
fiduciary duty. 8
The sixth case, Esopus Creek Value LP v. Hauf,79 is similar to Telvest in
that the directors in Esopus manipulated the voting requirements for
organic changes, but it was different in that the Esopus directors did not
seek to entrench themselves in office. The board in Esopus sought to avoid
the need for a shareholder vote on a sale of all of the corporation's assets
by voluntarily putting the corporation in bankruptcy where no such vote
was required. 80 The shareholders sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin
the corporation from executing an agreement for the sale of the
corporation's assets without a shareholder vote. 8' The Delaware Court of
Chancery found that the directors acted in good faith 82 and without an
72. Id.
73. Id. at *2.
74. See id. at *5 (questioning whether the First Series Preferred was really
preferred stock because "any supposed preference as to dividends or liquidation rights
seems illusory at best").
75. See id. at *6 (finding the board's resolution could not "have the effect of
amending or supplementing in some respect [the] corporation's original certificate of
incorporation") (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 104).
76. Id. at *7.
77. Id.
78. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (delineating cases that hold that, if
directors or controlling shareholders manipulate the corporate machinery to perpetuate
their own control, they have violated their fiduciary duties).
79. 913 A.2d 593 (Del. Ch. 2006).
80. Id. at 596.
81. Id.at6Ol.
82. Id. at 602-03.
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entrenchment motive; 83 in fact, the directors' actions would unseat, rather
than entrench, them in office.84  The court nevertheless granted the
injunction, reasoning that since the corporation was financially healthy and
had admitted that it was using the bankruptcy route to avoid the required
shareholder vote: the proposed scheme "work[ed] a profound inequity
upon the company's common stockholders and is thus prohibited by the
teaching of Schnell.
' 85
Finally, Dart v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co.s6 was not a voting case
at all but was instead a suit by a preferred stockholder complaining about
various aspects of the defendants' leveraged buy-out ("LBO"). In a motion
to dismiss, the court dismissed all of plaintiffs allegations that could
possibly state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty; 87 the one allegation that
remained attacked the effect of the LBO on the security of the preferred
stockholders' investment. 88 Citing Schnell, the court explained that
[a]lthough everything done by defendants may have been in strict
compliance with the letter of Delaware law, it is possible that the totality
of actions resulted in an impermissible inequity to the holders of the
preferred stock. The difficulty with the challenged transaction is that it
was highly leveraged and the majority of the preferred stockholders
ended up still owning their shares . . . . The assets of the corporation
were used as sole security for the loans obtained for the purpose of
buying out the common stock and the public preferred stockholders were
left holding their shares in a corporation which, as a result of the
transaction, has a much greater debt and therefore perhaps a lessened
ability to pay preferred dividends. Such a leveraged buy-out calls for
judicial scrutiny to prevent possible abuse.8 9
The courts' invocation of the Schnell doctrine in these last two cases,
Esopus and Dart, is troubling. The court's holding in Esopus is based on
the view that the directors' decision to sell the corporation's assets in
bankruptcy was inequitable. The holding is troubling, however, because
the judge found that the directors were acting in good faith and that their
83. Id. at 603.
84. See id. (reasoning "a result of the proposed transaction is that Metromedia's
board will cease to exist following the plan of reorganization").
85. Id. at 604.
86. No. 7366, 1985 WL 21145 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1985).
87. See id. at *6 (dismissing fiduciary duty claim based on defendants paying an
unfair price); id. at *7 (dismissing fiduciary duty claim for disclosure violations in the
proxy materials); cf id. at *6 (dismissing claims regarding defendant management
getting an ownership interest in the new venture because such claims are derivative in
nature and thus could not be brought in its current form as a class action).
88. See id. at *5.
89. Id.
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conduct did not entrench them in office;90 in contrast, all other Schnell
violations, except Dart,91 were cases where the directors breached their
fiduciary duties.92 Quite remarkably, in Esopus, the challenged conduct
90. Supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 87 (noting that the court in Dart dismissed all fiduciary duty
claims).
92. As supra note 50 explains, the Schnell cases can be broken down into two
categories: those pertaining to voting for directors and those pertaining to transactional
issues. Out of the six voting cases, see supra note 50, the courts found that the
directors were acting with improper motive in three of them. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439-40 (Del. 1971) (granting a preliminary injunction
because the board manipulated corporate machinery for the purpose of perpetrating
itself in office); Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int'l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43, 74 (Del. Ch. 2008)
.(setting aside election results because the directors used their power for the purpose of
entrenching themselves in office); Packer v. Yampol, 1986 WL 4748, at *15 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 18, 1986) (granting a preliminary injunction because the directors' "primary
purpose was to obstruct plaintiffs' ability to wage a meaningful proxy contest in order
to maintain themselves in control"). The remaining three voting cases invalidated
board action when defendants engaged in entrenchment action despite the lack of bad
of faith or subjective intent. See Linton v. Everett, No. 15219, 1997 WL 441189, at *9
(Del. Ch. July 31, 1997) (setting aside director bylaw amendment because the "conduct
of management.. . was both inequitable (in the sense of being unnecessary under the
circumstances) and [ ... ] had the accompanying dual effect of thwarting shareholder
opposition and perpetuating management in office" and stating that "it is not required
that... actual subjective intent to impede the voting process[] be shown"); Hubbard v.
Hollywood Park Realty Enters., Inc., No. 11779, 1991 WL 3151, at *7, *12 n.9 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 14, 1991) (granting a preliminary injunction because the "board action
constitut[ed] an inequitable manipulation of the corporate machinery that affected
adversely the shareholders' right to conduct a contested election of directors" even
though the directors "acted in good faith and took no steps overtly to change the
electoral rules themselves" and stating that "to be inequitable, such conduct does not
necessarily require a dishonest, selfish, or evil motive"); Lerman v. Diagnostic Data,
Inc., 421 A.2d 906, 912 (Del. Ch. 1980) (invalidating directors' bylaw amendment
because, "whether designedly inequitable or not, [the amendment] has had a terminal
effect on the [shareholders' ability to wage a proxy contest]"). In six of the eight
transaction cases, see supra note 50, the court found that directors or controlling
shareholders were improperly motivated and self-interested. See Rabkin v. Philip A.
Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1106-07 (Del. 1985) (reversing the Delaware Court
of Chancery's dismissal because the directors, in bad faith, took inequitable action to
avoid its contractual commitment to cash-out the minority shareholders at a fixed
price); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977), overruled on other
grounds by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (reversing the
Delaware Court of Chancery's dismissal because the merger was made for the sole
purpose of freezing out minority shareholders); Berger v. Intelident Solutions, Inc., 911
A.2d 1164, 1174-75 (Del. Ch. 2006) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss because
the controlling stockholder, who stood to benefit from not having to pay fair market
value, purposefully manipulated the timing of the proxy process in a cash-out merger to
intentionally deprive the minority shareholders from seeking their statutory right to
appraisal); Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1081 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(granting a preliminary injunction because "the plain purpose of these [b]ylaw
[a]mendments was to disable the [i]nternational board" to keep the controlling
shareholder in control); Hamilton v. Nozko, No. 13014, 1994 WL 413299, at *6 (Del.
Ch. July 27, 1994) (denying the defendants' motion to dismiss because the defendants
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would cause the directors to lose their power, rather than entrench them in
it.93 Thus, there was no finding that the directors were not disinterested or
independent or that their decision-making process was faulty. Instead,
Vice Chancellor Stephen Lamb's conclusion in Esopus that the board's
decision was inequitable was based solely on his gut feeling that the
directors' decision was unfair. Similarly, in Dart, the court dismissed all of
the plaintiffs' allegations that could state a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty. 94  Despite considering and rejecting all possible fiduciary claims,
Vice Chancellor Maurice Hartnett nevertheless held that there could be a
Schnell violation simply because he perceived the effect of the LBO might
increase the risk of the preferred stockholders' investment. 95 Concluding
that Esopus and Dart might be wrongly decided, however, would miss the
more important point: Esopus and Dart expose a critical weakness in the
Schnell case law.
The weakness in the Schnell cases is that, in deciding to invalidate
directors' decisions, courts sometimes bypassed the most well-established
judicial methodology of reviewing directors' decisions: the business
judgment rule. The business judgment rule is designed to preclude judges
from second-guessing directors' business decisions by limiting initial
judicial review solely to the process by which directors made their
96 97decision. In this process, directors enjoy a presumption of propriety.
As such, plaintiffs must dislodge this presumption by making a prima facie
case that the directors were either not disinterested, not independent, acting
"committed the Company [to going private] for self-interested purposes, unrelated to
any disinterested business judgment as to what was in the corporation's best interests");
Telvest, Inc. v. Olson, 1979 WL 1759, at *1-2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 1979) (granting a
preliminary injunction because the directors' distribution of preferred stock, which was
done for the sole purpose of preventing a twenty-percent stockholder from securing a
merger, was self-serving and improperly motivated); see also supra note 32 and
accompanying text (noting that the court in Blasius assumed that all Schnell violations
required improper motive).
93. See supra note 84 and accompanying text; cf Dart, 1985 WL 21145, at *1
(supporting proposed leveraged buy-out where directors would get an equity position in
the refinanced corporation but would lose control of it).
94. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
95. Dart, 1985 WL 21145, at *5.
96. See STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 45 (6th ed. 2009)
("[C]ourts give deference to directors' decisions reached by a proper process, and do
not apply an objective reasonableness test in such case to examine the wisdom of the
decision itself.") (internal citation omitted).
97. See id. at 42 (noting that Delaware law "presumes that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company")
(internal quotations omitted); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984) (noting that, under the business judgment rule, courts will not disturb the
judgment of directors absent abuse of their decision-making power).
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in bad faith, or grossly negligent. 98 If plaintiffs are successful, then-and
only then-can the court review the directors' decision. Even then,
directors can attempt to show that they nevertheless produced a fair result
for the corporation.
99
In contrast, when judges engaged in a Schnell review, they typically did
not acknowledge the business judgment rule.100 Instead, upon receiving the
plaintiffs' Schnell claims, some courts either did not review the directors'
decision-making process, or they did such a review and found the process
without fault; nevertheless, some judges concluded that the defendants
violated the Schnell doctrine1' 0 1 While some Schnell cases engaged in this
98. See William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over
Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporate Law, 56 Bus.
LAW. 1287, 1298 (2001) ("[A] standard formulation of the business judgment rule in
Delaware is that it creates a presumption that (i) a decision was made by directors who
(ii) were disinterested and independent, (iii) acted in subjective good faith, and (iv)
employed a reasonable decision making process.").
99. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (holding
that, if the business judgment rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to defendant directors
to prove the transaction was entirely fair to the shareholders).
100. Seven Schnell cases did not mention the business judgment rule. See Rabkin
v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985); Singer v. Magnavox Co.,
380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), overruled on other grounds by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del.
1971); Berger v. Intelident Solutions, Inc., 911 A.2d 1164 (Del. Ch. 2006); Hubbard v.
Hollywood Park Realty Enters., Inc., No. 11779, 1991 WL 3151 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14,
1991); Dart v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., No. 7366, 1985 WL 21145 (Del. Ch.
May 9, 1985); Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 906 (Del. Ch. 1980). Three
Schnell cases mentioned the business judgment rule but not in connection with the
Schnell analysis. See Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int'l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43, 69 (Del. Ch. 2008);
Linton v. Everett, No. 15219, 1997 WL 441189, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1997);
Telvest, Inc. v. Olson, 1979 WL 1759, at *6-7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 1979). Only three
Schnell cases provided an explanation regarding why the business judgment rule was
inapplicable. See Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1060-61, 1078 (Del.
Ch. 2004) (reasoning that the business judgment rule did not apply because the
defendant breached his fiduciary duties); Hamilton v. Nozko, No. 13014, 1994 WL
413299, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 27, 1994) (holding the business judgment rule did not
apply to these directors because they were neither disinterested nor independent);
Packer v. Yampol, 1986 WL 4748, at *14 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 1986) (rejecting the
defendants' argument that the directors were disinterested and, therefore, protected by
the business judgment rule because the directors "stood to benefit" from the "increased
likelihood of the directors' continued incumbency").
101. See Esopus Creek Value LP v. Hauf, 913 A.2d 593, 602-03 (Del. Ch. 2006)
(examining the directors' decision-making process and finding no fault with it but
nonetheless evaluating the decision); Dart v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., No.
7366, 1985 WL 21145, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1985) (failing to mention the business
judgment rule and dismissing all of plaintiffs' allegations that could state a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty but nonetheless examining the possible negative impact of the
directors' decision); see also infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text (discussing
how the courts' decisions in Esopus and Dart transgressed the business judgment rule).
One can also question whether courts found Schnell violations based on the
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major departure from the business judgment rule, all Schnell cases except
Esopus and Dart ended up in the right place: in all of the other cases, the
courts' explicit or implicit findings that the directors breached their
fiduciary duties'0 2 would have prevented these directors from enjoying the
protection of the business judgment rule. Therefore, even if those courts
had followed the business judgment rule, they ultimately would have been
able to evaluate the directors' decision.
Esopus turns this paradigm on its head. After finding that the directors
did not have any entrenchment motive or bad faith, the court nevertheless
proceeded to evaluate the directors' conduct anyway, decided that conduct
was unfair, and then equated unfair conduct with a Schnell violation.'
0 3
The court in Esopus should not have been able to second guess the fairness
of the board's decision unless it first found fault in the process. In other
words, although the court found no fault in the process that the directors
employed in making their decision, Vice Chancellor Lamb simply
invalidated the directors' conduct because he did not like it. Tellingly, in
Dart, the court explicitly rejected any allegation that could relate to a
breach of fiduciary duty. 10 4 Despite that determination, Vice Chancellor
Maurice Hartnett proceeded to evaluate the directors' conduct and
concluded it could be unfair. Former Delaware Supreme Court Chief
Justice Myron Steele, in an unrelated case, dissented on the same grounds
that Esopus and Dart are faulty; among other reasons, the court found the
directors' conduct inequitable without finding they had violated their
fiduciary duties.' 
05
Thus, the fourteen Schnell cases are instructive in two ways. First, all
conduct that violates the Schnell doctrine is, or should also be, a breach of
fiduciary duty, and the failure of Schnell and other cases applying the
Schnell doctrine to state so clearly does not negate this truism. As the court
in Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp. aptly described, these cases are
a "breach of fiduciary duties under Schnell.', 10 6 Second, if a judge applies
entrenchment effect of the directors' actions despite also finding that these respective
directors had no improper motive. See generally Linton, No. 15219, 1997 WL 441189;
Hubbard, No. 11779, 1991 WL 3151; Lerman, 421 A.2d 906.
102. See supra notes 52-54, 59-78, and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
105. See Omnicare Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 946-50 (Steele, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's invalidation of a contract when "the board
of directors acted selflessly pursuant to a careful, fair process and [acted] in good
faith .... ).
106. Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1105 (Del. 1985); see
also supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (delineating Schnell cases that held, or
strongly intimated, that there was a breach of fiduciary duties).
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the Schnell doctrine to a case where the directors did not breach their
fiduciary duties, the judge has invalidated legal conduct based simply on
his or her gut instinct. The implications of judges deciding cases based
solely on their instincts are profound.
Just as judges ought to find a breach of fiduciary duty if they find a
Schnell violation, so too have scholars equated Schnell violations with a
breach of fiduciary duties. For example, Chief Justice Strine-as Vice
Chancellor-wrote an article analyzing a different aspect of the Schnell
doctrine from the one explored here. 10 7 In his article, Chief Justice Strine
often interchanged the concepts of Schnell violations and breaches of
fiduciary duties. 08 Similarly, Professor Larry Ribstein used Schnell as one
of two cases to support the principle that "fiduciary duties... trump
statutory authorization."' 0 9 Finally, in a group-authored article about the
duty of loyalty, the authors wrote, "[i]n Schnell, the Delaware Supreme
Court emphatically voiced its acceptance of the importance of fiduciary
review in ensuring that the capacious authority granted to directors by the
DGCL was not misused." '" 0
A. The Current Bylaw Cases - More Confusion about the Schnell
Doctrine and Breaches of Fiduciary Duties
There are several Delaware cases where judges have declared a given
bylaw to be facially valid, while also holding that shareholders can again
challenge the situational validity of the bylaw if their corporation ever
implements it."I  For example, in Moran v. Household Internationa'l,
107. See Strine, supra note 1, at 880 (discussing the role of law and equity in
Delaware-corporate law and the need for judges to "respect the law side of the law-
equity divide in exercising their equitable powers," such as when judges are engaged in
a Schnell review).
108. See, e.g., id. at 880 (discussing Schnell violations in the context of breaches of
fiduciary duties); id. at 881 (noting that Schnell reinforced the role of equity and
defined equity as "the judge-made common law of corporations as reflected in judicial
articulations of the fiduciary duties of directors and officers"); id at 882 (stating that
Schnell reinforced "[t]hat equitable principles of fiduciary duty would be an overlay to
and a constraint on the statutory powers of directors"); id. at 887 (identifying the key
disputes in Schnell cases and noting that they "were about whether legally permissible
actions were ... equitable in the sense that they were not tainted by a breach of
fiduciary duty"); id. at 903 (finding that Schnell "permits the invalidation of legally
permitted acts that result from a breach of an equitable duty"); see also supra note 21
and accompanying text.
109. Larry E. Ribstein, Preemption as Micromanagement, 65 Bus. LAw. 789, 795
(2010).
110. Strine et al., supra note 21, at 642.
111. See generally ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 555 (Del.
2014); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992); Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501
A.2d 401 (Del. 1985); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); City
of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229 (Del. Ch. 2014); Edgen
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Inc.,'1 2 the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a director-enacted poison-pill
bylaw 1 3 but cautioned that the court would review the bylaw again under
fiduciary standards if its implementation is challenged:
When the Household Board of Directors is faced with a tender offer and
a request to redeem the Rights, they will not be able to arbitrarily reject
the offer. They will be held to the same fiduciary standards any other
board of directors would be held to in deciding to adopt a defensive
mechanism, the same standard as they were held to in originally
approving the Rights Plan.' 
14
Note that the Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that implementation
would be subject to fiduciary review,1 15 but the court made no mention of
the Schnell doctrine.
Before the Delaware legislature's recent amendments to the DGCL to
outlaw fee-shifting in stock corporations and to permit forum-selection
clauses,1 1 6 Delaware courts again used Moran's two-step model to rule on
the facial validity of director-enacted bylaws on these two subjects. Unlike
the court in Moran, the Delaware courts mentioned Schnell in both of the
recent cases. In an en banc opinion in A TP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis
Bund, the Delaware Supreme Court responded to four certified questions of
law regarding the validity of a director-adopted bylaw in a non-stock
corporation that shifted attorneys' fees and costs to unsuccessful plaintiffs
in intra-corporate litigation." 7  Although declaring such a bylaw to be
facially valid,1 8 Justice Carolyn Berger warned, without mentioning
fiduciary duties-but still citing to Schnell-that "[b]ylaws that may
otherwise be facially valid will not be enforced if adopted or used for an
inequitable purpose."' 19 Following Moran, Justice Berger further held that
the future enforceability of any fee-shifting bylaw would depend on the
Grp. Inc. v. Genoud, C.A. No. 9055-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 2013); Boilermakers Local
154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron, 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
112. 500A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
113. Id. at 1357; see also MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. Cox, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 1239 (1 1th ed. 2014) (defining a poison-pill
bylaw as "a plan under which the board of directors of a corporation creates Rights that
are distributed or distributable to shareholders ... [and] upon the occurrence of certain
events shareholders.., have the right to purchase stock in the corporation ... at a deep
discount. Because the potential exercise of the Rights would dramatically dilute the
value of the target stock that the bidder proposes to acquire, the mere potential that the
Rights will be exercised may serve as a deterrent to making a bid in the first place.").
114. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354.
115. Id.
116. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 102(), 109(b), 114(b)(2), 115 (West 2015).
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facts under which the directors actually implement the bylaw. 20
Similarly, in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp.,
then-Chancellor Strine held that board-adopted forum-selection bylaws
were facially valid.12 1 The court further held that "valid bylaw[s] may
operate inequitably in a particular scenario" and would be dealt with by the
Schnell doctrine.12 2  The court warned that, if and when the directors
implement the bylaw, "a court will have a concrete factual situation against
which to ... analyze, b la Schnell, whether the directors' use of the bylaws
is a breach of fiduciary duty."'
123
Thus, in discussing the standard for monitoring director bylaws when
they are actually implemented, the Delaware Supreme Court in Moran
discussed only fiduciary duties and in ATP discussed only Schnell;
however, the Delaware Court of Chancery in Boilermakers discussed both
fiduciary duties and Schnell interchangeably. ATP, a 2014 en banc
Delaware Supreme Court opinion, demonstrated that Delaware courts have
not yet incorporated the interplay between Schnell violations and breaches
of fiduciary duties.
24
III. WHY HAVE Two DOCTRINES?
In an intriguing article, 25 former-Justice Jack Jacobs asked a perceptive
question about the logic of the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in
Alabama By-Products Corp. v. Neal, a case which admonished courts to
120. Id. at 558-60.
121. 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
122. Id. at 949.
123. Id. at 959; see also id. at 954 (remarking, "the real-world application of a
forum selection bylaw can be challenged as an inequitable breach of fiduciary duty"
and citing to Schnell); id. at 958 (reasoning that the plaintiff may mount an argument
under Schnell that the bylaw "should not be enforced because the bylaw was being used
for improper purposes inconsistent with the directors' fiduciary duties").
124. Unlike the Schnell doctrine, all Delaware equitable remedies need not monitor
only fiduciary duties. For example, the equitable remedy of quasi-appraisal rights can
monitor breaches of the fiduciary duty of disclosure as well as non-fiduciary breaches.
Compare Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 873 A.2d 305, 308 (Del. Ch. 2005) (reasoning the
directors "breached their fiduciary duty of disclosure by not providing any disclosure
relating to [the corporation's] financial condition to the stockholders faced with the
decision of whether to take the cash or demand appraisal"), with Nebel v. Southwest
Bancorp, Inc., 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 80 (Del. Ch. July 5, 1995) (reasoning that
although the directors failed to provide shareholders with an accurate copy of the
appraisal statute in connection with a short-form merger, directors did not breach their
fiduciary duties). See also Mary Siegel, The Dangers of Equitable Remedies, 15 STAN.
J.L. Bus. & FIN 86, 110 (2009) (stating that, in quasi-appraisal cases, "the primary fact
pattern is that defendant allegedly violated its fiduciary duty to disclose, and that
violation impacted plaintiffs' process of deciding whether to take the merger
consideration or demand appraisal rights").
125. Jacobs, supra note 18.
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limit the Schnell doctrine to cases that either "threaten the fabric of law" or
would "deprive a person of a clear right."'1 26 Specifically, Justice Jacobs
wrote:
How does one decide whether fiduciary conduct 'threatens the fabric of
the law?' And if equity can be used to override the law only where an
'improper manipulation of the law would deprive a person of a clear
right,' why is equity needed at all, since if the right being violated is
clear, that alone would afford a basis for relief.
127
In other words, Justice Jacobs pointed out that, under the Delaware
Supreme Court's standards delineated in Alabama By-Products, the Schnell
doctrine would serve no purpose; the standard is both too amorphous to
decide what is threatening to the fabric of law, and it is superfluous if a
clear right exists. Similarly, this Article asks the same question about the
need for the Schnell doctrine, but this time, the question is based on
Schnell's redundancy: why is the Schnell doctrine needed when Delaware
courts incontrovertibly have the power to invalidate otherwise legal
conduct based on a breach of fiduciary duties? Phrased differently, having
established that all Schnell violations are, or should be, breaches of
fiduciary duty, what are the costs and benefits of maintaining the Schnell
doctrine, and what would be the costs and benefits from abolishing it?
A. Are There Benefits and Costs of Maintaining the Status Quo?
Four possible arguments exist for retaining the Schnell doctrine as a tool
for judicial review. The first is that the Schnell doctrine is still needed to
require fiduciaries to comply with both legal and equitable duties. A
second argument is that the Schnell doctrine is case-specific while some
case holdings delineating fiduciary duties have broader applicability.
Third, if the Schnell doctrine remained available, it could serve as the
reservoir for analyzing all voting cases instead of maintaining the current
patchwork of voting monitors.1 28 The final argument is that the Schnell
doctrine permits the court to have a broader reach: a judge could use the
doctrine to invalidate conduct that simply does not "feel" right even when
the judge cannot find a breach of fiduciary duty. All four of these
arguments, however, lack merit.
First, while Schnell may have been necessary-or at least instrumental-
in establishing the role of equity in Delaware corporate law, 129 the Schnell
doctrine is no longer needed for this purpose. No one would seriously
126. 588 A.2d 255, 258 n.I (Del. 1991).
127. Jacobs, supra note 18, at 11.
128. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text (discussing the role of Schnell
after the passage of the DGCL in 1967).
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challenge that directors must comply not only with the DGCL and the
corporation's own legal documents but also with the directors' fiduciary
duties. As Chancellor Allen reasoned in Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., "[i]t
is an elementary proposition of corporation law that ... fiduciary duties
constitute a network of responsibilities that overlay the exercise of even
undoubted legal power."' 30  One may further ask how instrumental the
Schnell doctrine continues to be since its initial foundational contribution to
Delaware corporate law if there have only been fourteen violations in the
doctrine's forty-five year history.' 
3
'
Second, some may argue that fiduciary duties and Schnell violations
differ in that Delaware courts apply the Schnell doctrine in discrete
situations, affecting the rights of one corporation's shareholders. In
contrast, in at least some cases where courts have held that directors
breached their fiduciary duties, the court's articulation of those duties has
had broad applicability, extending beyond the particular case. Weinberger,
for example, delineated requirements for directors to satisfy their fiduciary
duties in a conflict-of-interest going private transaction.' 32 Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., as modified by Unitrin, Inc. v. American General
Corp., similarly gave content to directors' fiduciary duties in the context of
their enacting defensive tactics,' 33 and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc. did so for so-called "Revlon" transactions. 134 As
now Chief Justice Strine wrote, "[b]ecause of the importance of fiduciary
duty review to our system of corporate law, the judiciary will often issue
decisions that have more than case-specific influence."' 35  Whether
decisions finding fiduciary breaches have narrow or broad applicability
does not detract, however, from the fundamental fact that since Schnell
review constitutes fiduciary review, the existence of two doctrines is
redundant.
Third, an argument can be made that the Schnell doctrine should be the
130. 579A.2d 1115, 1121 (Del. Ch. 1990).
131. See supra note 51 (delineating the fourteen cases where courts have found
Schnell violations).
132. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (requiring fair dealing
and fair price in a conflict-of-interest going-private transaction); see also supra notes
22-28 and accompanying text.
133. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985), and
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995) (requiring directors
who enact defensive tactics to demonstrate a threat to the corporation's policies, and to
have reacted reasonably, including but not limited to not enacting coercive or
preclusive defensive tactics).
134. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1985) (requiring directors to attempt to maximize profits for shareholders when
the corporation is in so-called Revlon mode).
135. Strine, supra note 1, at 904-05.
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go-to monitor for shareholder voting, the most likely candidate for a topic
that "threatens the fabric of corporate law."' 36 Two problems exist with
this argument. One is that, although most Schnell cases are about
shareholder voting,' 37 the Schnell doctrine has no topical limits.' 38 Second,
even if the Delaware Supreme Court cabined the Schnell doctrine to cases
about shareholder voting, that decision alone would not effectuate a
consolidation of all voting cases, given that Delaware courts have reviewed
cases about shareholder voting under myriad monitors. 39 Furthermore, to
date, Delaware courts have given no indication either that all voting issues
should be corralled into one monitor or, if so, that the monitor of choice
would be the Schnell doctrine.
40
The final argument supporting retention of the Schnell doctrine-and
perhaps the only contentious one-is that the Schnell doctrine permits
judges to invalidate action that simply does not "feel" right without the
conduct constituting a breach of fiduciary duty. The argument is that the
doctrine empowers judges to utilize their equitable powers to effectuate the
result they instinctively believe is correct by labeling the conduct as
inequitable as the courts did in Esopus and Dart. Invalidating legal
action that simply does not "feel" right to a judge, however, is a standard
136. Alabama By-Products v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 259 n.l (Del. 1991); see also
supra text accompanying note 126.
137. See supra note 50 (noting that six of the fourteen Schnell cases are about
shareholder voting for directors and that another four cases involve shareholder voting
on transactions).
138. See, e.g., Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1106-07
(Del. 1985) (applying Schnell when defendants attempted to evade the corporation's
contractual commitment to cash-out the minority shareholders at a fixed price); Singer
v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977), overruled on other grounds by
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (applying Schnell when defendants
froze out minority shareholders without a valid corporate purpose); Hollinger Int'l, Inc.
v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1081 (Del. Ch. 2004) (applying Schnell when the CEO and
controlling shareholder enacted a bylaw to disable the board from performing its
statutorily-authorized duties); Hamilton v. Nozko, No. 13014, 1994 WL 413299, at *6-
7 (Del. Ch. July 27, 1994) (applying Schnell when the defendants intentionally delisted
the corporation to force the minority to sell their shares at a grossly unfair price).
139. Delaware courts have reviewed some voting cases under the business
judgment rule, see City of Westland Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Axcelis Tech., Inc., 1
A.3d 281, 291 (Del. 2010), under enhanced business judgment, see Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985), and under the compelling purpose
test, see Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661-02 (Del Ch. 1988); see
also discussion of Blasius supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (discussing voting
monitor).
140. Cf Mercier v. Inter-Tel, Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 810 (Del. Ch. 2007) (suggesting
that the enhanced business judgment monitor would be preferable to the compelling-
purpose test as a monitor of voting issues).
141. See discussion of Esopus and Dart, supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
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most jurists would eschew. 142 Why permit courts to invalidate directors'
otherwise legal conduct based on feel instead of by an articulation of why
the conduct constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty? Moreover, as
demonstrated above, 4 3 since nearly all Schnell cases are breaches of
fiduciary duties, neither Schnell nor its progeny seem to authorize judges to
invalidate legal conduct based simply on an uneasy feeling. Perhaps this
lack of authority is the answer as to why there are only fourteen cases
decided under Schnell: Delaware judges instinctively know that they
should articulate why they choose to invalidate conduct that is legally
sufficient and that invalidation inevitably becomes a discussion of a breach
of fiduciary duty rather than about the judge's gut instinct. One of Chief
Justice Strine's earlier articles forcefully echoed this concern about Schnell
violations:
[A] determination that legally permitted action should be enjoined
requires the court to find that there was a specific breach of an equitable
duty. That does not necessarily mean that the judge must conclude that
the directors acted for a disloyal purpose. But, at minimum, it requires
the court to articulate why the directors did not fulfill their fiduciary
duties in the circumstances they confronted... The very requirement to
explain how actual businesspersons violated the equitable standard of
conduct required of them tempers judicial overreaching and encourages
modesty. 1
In other words, articulating the contours and causes of the fiduciary
breach has the concomitant effect of preventing judges from invalidating
action that simply does not feel right and "tempers judicial
overreaching.' ' 145 It is thus not surprising that Justice Strine articulated the
breach of fiduciary duty in all opinions in which he applied the Schnell
doctrine. 146 If judges are indeed utilizing some gut feeling instead of a
142. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1378 (Del. 1993) ("The court's
decision should not be the product solely of subjective, reflexive impressions based
primarily on suspicion or what has sometimes been called the 'smell test.""); KE Prop.
Mgmt., Inc. v. 275 Madison Mgmt. Corp., Civ. A. No. 12683, 1993 WL 285900, at *9
(Del. Ch. July 27, 1993) (citing Nixon for the same proposition); see also infra notes
144-45 and accompanying text (noting Chief Justice Strine's statement that a judge
must "articulate why the directors did not fulfill their fiduciary duties" to "temper[]
judicial overreaching").
143. See supra notes 52-54, 59-78, and accompanying text (explaining twelve of
fourteen Schnell cases are also fiduciary breaches).
144. See Strine, supra note 1, at 904 (emphasis added); see also id. at 888
("Importantly, even when a court was deploying the tightened reasonableness standard,
its ability to strike down lawful action required it to identify expressly why the
directors had acted unreasonably in the circumstances and therefore breached their
fiduciary duties.").
145. Strine, supra note 1, at 904.
146. See Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int'l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43, 75 (Del. Ch. 2008) (finding
the CEO breached fiduciary duties and violated the Schnell doctrine by intentionally
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reasoned fiduciary analysis, they are making bad law.
There is no current benefit to retaining the Schnell doctrine, but there is a
cost to maintaining the status quo: the coexistence of the Schnell doctrine
and fiduciary law implies that there is a difference between the two forms
of review. Twelve of the fourteen Schnell cases counter that inference, and
the remaining two cases, Esopus and Dart, demonstrate the dangers where
Schnell violations are not fiduciary breaches. Thus, the current coexistence
of the Schnell doctrine and fiduciary review is confusing if all Schnell
violations are--or should be-a breach of the duty of loyalty and of great
concern if they are not.
B. Would There Be Benefits or Costs to Abolishing the Schnell Doctrine?
The major benefit of abolishing the Schnell doctrine would be judicial
recognition that directors' legal actions can be invalidated only if the
directors breached their fiduciary duties. A clear process that adheres to
the tenets of the business judgment rule and that is thoroughly articulated
would enhance the clarity and consistency that is a hallmark of Delaware
law. 147 An ancillary benefit is abolition of the doctrine obviates any need
to resolve the different judicial views on whether Schnell violations require
directors to have acted with an improper motive. 148 Since identifying the
directors' "true" motive can be a daunting task,149 abolishing the Schnell
using corporate assets to coerce shareholders into voting as the CEO wanted);
Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1081 (Del. Ch. 2004) (finding that
conduct of the CEO and controlling shareholder was a breach of fiduciary duty and a
violation of Schnell because the shareholder-enacted bylaw amendments' sole purpose
was to prevent the board from performing its statutorily-authorized duties and to
effectuate illegal or inequitable activities); cf Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v.
Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 949 (Del. Ch. 2013) (reasoning by then-Vice Chancellor
Strine that the directors' implementation of their bylaw could, in the future, violate
Schnell if the directors breached their fiduciary duties).
147. See, e.g., The Hon. Myron T. Steele: Delaware Courts, Corporate Governance
And Corporate Counsel, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Nov. 1, 2004, at 52,
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/4765/delaware-hon-myron-t-steele-delawar
e-courts-corporate-govemance-and-corporate-counsel ("We must be sure that our
opinions continue to be characterized by three words that are the hallmark of Delaware
courts: predictability, consistency and clarity.").
148. See supra notes 92-93 (noting inconsistent holdings on whether Schnell
violations require an improper motive).
149. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721-22 (Del. 1971)
(reasoning that, if shareholders got their pro rata share of the benefits of each of the
three challenged transactions, the court would conclude that the directors had not been
motivated by self-interest); Mary Siegel, The Problems and Promise of "Enhanced
Business Judgment"," 17 U PA. J. OF Bus. L. 47, 73-74 (2014) (identifying that
Delaware courts have looked for tangible harm to the corporation to determine whether
directors were truly motivated to act in the best interest of the corporation or whether
they instead had a selfish motive either when they enacted defensive tactics or when the
corporation was in a "Revlon" mode).
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doctrine would help courts considerably.
If one accepts the premise that Schnell violations are simply a subset of
breaches of the duty of loyalty, there is no cost to abolishing the Schnell
doctrine. Abolition of the Schnell doctrine should not cause shareholders
any concern that such abolition empowers directors to implement any
bylaw under any circumstance, manipulate the voting process, or take any
other inequitable action that constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty.
Similarly, courts should not fear that abolition of the Schnell doctrine
dilutes their equitable powers.
CONCLUSION
At its inception, the Schnell doctrine undoubtedly served the important
function of establishing the role of equity in Delaware corporate law. A
clear-eyed view of the doctrine, however, demonstrates that Schnell
violations are nothing more than breaches of fiduciary duty and should be
nothing less. Importantly, if the Schnell violation is less than a breach of
fiduciary duty, then the doctrine wrongly empowers judges to invalidate
otherwise legal conduct based only on intuitive unease with directors' or
controlling shareholders' conduct.
All arguments for keeping a doctrine that allows the courts to effectuate
their perception of a fair result may appear reasonable, but the dangers of
such an approach have been well-documented. In fact, the Schnell doctrine
has become a wolf in sheep's clothing by transgressing the business
judgment rule. Given the unassailable benefits of the business judgment
rule, applying the Schnell doctrine in violation of the rule has broad
negative implications for Delaware corporate law.
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